Broc Romanek is Editor of CorporateAffairs.tv, TheCorporateCounsel.net, CompensationStandards.com & DealLawyers.com. He also serves as Editor for these print newsletters: Deal Lawyers; Compensation Standards & the Corporate Governance Advisor. He is Commissioner of TheCorporateCounsel.net's "Blue Justice League" & curator of its "Deal Cube Museum."
Even though it’s voluntary, many of you will soon be evaluating whether the costs savings promised by e-Proxy truly exist. In my opinion, that issue actually is a drop in the bucket compared to some of the other issues that you need to learn about when it comes to e-Proxy. For example, even if your company doesn’t use e-Proxy, dissidents can use it if they contest a director election or another matter on the annual meeting ballot.
To learn more, tune in to tomorrow’s webcast – “How to Implement E-Proxy: Avoiding the Surprises and Making the Calculations” – which has just been bumped up to 90 minutes since there is so much material to cover. With e-Proxy effective at the end of this month, this will be a very timely – and practical – webcast. Join these experts:
– Tom Ball, Senior Managing Director, Morrow & Co.
– Joe Frumkin, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell
– Carl Hagberg, Independent Inspector of Elections and Editor of The Shareholder Service Optimizer
– Dominic Jones, Editor, IR Web Report
– Alan Singer, Partner, Morgan Lewis & Bockius
– Sid Rodrigue, Vice President, Broadridge (formerly known as ADP)
Among the topics to be discussed are:
– What does voluntary e-Proxy involve? Will voting patterns change?
– What should be considered in determining whether to forego paper next proxy season?
– How third-parties might use e-Proxy to wage proxy campaigns?
– What are the latest drafting tips to design “usable” proxy materials for the Web?
– How should your proxy solicitation and IR strategies change in the wake of e-Proxy?
E-Proxy Webcast: Important Course Materials to Print
For tomorrow’s e-Proxy webcast, please print these two sets of course materials:
NYSE Finally Revises Its Corporate Governance Proposal
Last Friday, the NYSE filed Amendment No. 1 to its proposal to modify the corporate governance listing standards set forth in Section 303A of the Listed Company Manual with the SEC. The original proposal, filed way back in late 2005, provided clarifications to the current standards and codified certain NYSE and SEC interpretations.
The most significant change in the original proposal related to the Section 303A.02(a) independent director disclosure requirements. However, last August, the SEC adopted amendments to Item 407 of Regulation S-K that consolidated director independence and related corporate governance requirements under a single disclosure item. Since the SEC’s new rules sometimes duplicate (or require more detailed disclosures) than the NYSE’s governance standards, the amended proposal seeks to eliminate those disclosure requirements currently set forth in Section 303A that are also required by Item 407. Here are some of the highlights of the amended proposal:
1. Eliminate the controlled company exemption disclosure requirement to avoid duplication with Item 407.
2. Add a new component to Section 303A.00 regarding disclosure requirements to give a listed company the option of providing the required disclosures in its annual proxy statement or, if it does not file a proxy, in its annual report filed with the SEC; or on or through its website.
3. Eliminate the original proposal that required disclosures may not be summarized or incorporated by reference.
4. Eliminate the NYSE requirement that a company disclose in its proxy (or Form 10-K) that its audit, nominating and compensation committee charters, code of business conduct and ethics and corporate governance guidelines are available on its website and in print to any shareholder who requests them to avoid duplication with Item 407.
5. Eliminate the Section 303A.02(a) independent director disclosure requirements to avoid duplication with Item 407.
6. Increase the Section 303A.02(b)(ii) direct compensation bright line test dollar threshold from $100,000 to $120,000 to bring the standard in line with Item 404 of Regulation S-K.
7. Amend the Section 303A.02(b)(iii) external and internal auditor bright line test as it applies to a director with an immediate family member so that it applies only to an immediate family member who:
– is a current partner of such a firm;
– is a current employee of such a firm and personally works on the listed company’s audit; or
– was within the last three years a partner or employee of such a firm and personally worked on the listed company’s audit within that time.
8. Clarify that all interested parties, not only shareholders, must be able to communicate their concerns regarding the listed company to the presiding director or the non-management/independent directors as a group.
9. Eliminate the Section 303A.05(b)(i)(C) requirement relating to the preparation of the compensation committee report to avoid duplication with Item 407.
10. Eliminate the Section 303A.07(c)(i)(B) requirement relating to the preparation of the audit committee report to avoid duplication with Item 407.
11. Redesignate the Section 303A.14 website requirement, adopted in August 2006, as Section 307.00 of the Listed Company Manual and eliminate the current Sections 307.00 and 314.00 regarding related party transactions.
In the amended proposal, the NYSE is also proposed changes to Section 203.01 – the annual financial statement requirement – to provide that a listed company that is subject to the SEC’s proxy rules, or is a foreign private issuer that provides its audited financial statements (as included on Forms 10-K, 20-F and 40-F) to beneficial shareholders in a manner that is consistent with the physical or electronic delivery requirements applicable to annual reports set forth in the SEC’s proxy rules, is not required to issue the press release or post the undertaking required by Section 203.01.
We are providing this webconference as a “thank you” to our community – and due to the seriousness of the issues related to climate change. All of the panels will be archived if you can’t catch it today. Below is the agenda:
1. What the Studies Show: A Tutorial: Margaret Leinen, Chief Scientific Officer, Climos
2. The Business Case for Tackling Global Warming :
– John Stowell, Vice President, Environmental Health & Safety Policy, Duke Energy
– Bill Ellis, Visiting Fellow, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies
3. The Board’s Perspective: Strategic Opportunities and Fiduciary Duties:
– Michael Gerrard, Partner, Arnold & Porter
– Stephen Jones, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig
4. The Investor’s Perspective: What They Seek and Their Own Duties:
– Janice Hester Amey, Director of Corporate Governance, CalSTRS
– Doug Cogan, Deputy Director of Social Issues Services, Institutional Shareholder Services
– David Gardiner, Founder, David Gardiner & Associates
– Mindy Lubber, President, Ceres
5. Why You Need to Re-Examine Your D&O Insurance Policy:
– Wylie Donald, Partner, McCarter & English
– Peter Gillon, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig
6. Disclosure Obligations under SEC and Other Regulatory Frameworks:
– Miranda Anderson, VP, Investor Analysis, David Gardiner & Associates, LLC
– Maureen Crough, Partner, Sidley & Austin
– Jeff Smith, Partner, Cravath Swaine & Moore
7. How (and Why) to Modify Your Contracts: Force Majeure and Much More:
– Wylie Donald, Partner, McCarter & English
– Michael Gerrard, Partner, Arnold & Porter
8. Due Diligence Considerations When Doing Deals:
– Maureen Crough, Partner, Sidley & Austin
– Jeff Smith, Partner, Cravath Swaine & Moore
In addition to the webconference, there are plenty of other complimentary resources related to boards and climate change.
ESG = Environmental, Social and Governance
If you aren’t familiar with the acronym “ESG,” you will be soon as investors have reached a broad consensus that non-financial factors have a significant impact on investment performance. Just listening to Mindy Lubber, President of Ceres, during today’s webconference – “Tackling Global Warming: Challenges for Boards and their Advisors” – brings this point home. Ceres leads the Investor Network on Climate Risk, a group of leading institutional investors with collective assets of over $4 trillion.
To learn how some of the largest pension funds deal with ESG, see this new report (which gives a comprehensive overview of the different approaches taken by funds in various parts of the world). Also, ISS recently blogged about how ESG is playing a role in the investment process.
Bellwether Analysis: Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Backdated Options Derivative Case
From Travis Laster: On June 7th, Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued his opinion in Desimone v. Barrows, thereby providing a third major Delaware decision on stock option practices. There is much to digest in this 75-page opinion (which is posted in the CompensationStandards.com “Backdated Options” Practice Area). Here are some highlights:
1. On pages 38-43, VC Strine charts two scenarios involving backdating, one which he states would not give rise to any claim against directors and another which would. The core difference in the scenarios is whether the directors had reason to know that their actions were contrary to law. VC Strine’s paradigms will provide significant guidance to practitioners addressing option situations.
2. VC Strine rejects the idea that a “continuing wrong” exists when there have been a series of backdated options. Consistent with Ryan v. Gifford, VC Strine views each grant as a separate event. In Desimone, that meant that the plaintiff could not challenge grants pre-dating his stock ownership under Delaware’s continuous ownership rule.
3. As many commentators predicted, VC Strine holds that a board comprised of a majority of disinterested and independent directors can obtain a Rule 23.1 dismissal of stock option backdating claims. The Vice Chancellor distinguishes Ryan as a case in which half the board was conflicted and Tyson as a case in which there were detailed allegations of domination and control. VC Strine reaches this conclusion despite the fact that “Sycamore has essentially admitted in public filings that many [grants] were backdated.” The key issue under Rule 23.1, however, is not whether misconduct occurred, but rather “whether the … Board should be divested of its authority to address that misconduct.”
4. VC Strine notes at several points that he doubts whether any recognizable claim, other than a theoretical claim of waste based on overcompensation, could be asserted based on “bullet-dodging.” At that point, negative information has been disclosed to the markets and a grant at fair market value should not be problematic. Indeed, he observes that a contrary rule would incentivize option grants before the release of negative information, creating a counter-intuitive compensation strategy.
5. Desimone challenged various officer grants made under a plan that did not require fair-market-value grants, expressly permitted below-market-value grants, and under which virtually all employee grants were handled by a single executive officer without direct board oversight or involvement. VC Strine concludes that a challenge to these grants at most implicates a Caremark theory. He finds that Desimone failed to plead sufficient red flags to support any type of Caremark claim.
6. VC Strine holds that large grants of options to executive officers permit a pleading-stage inference of director knowledge of the terms of the grants. At the same time, however, VC Strine explicitly rejects the argument that the knowledge of any one director can be imputed to the others for purposes of demand excusal. Prior to this decision, Delaware courts had not meaningfully addressed imputation of knowledge among directors. VC Strine concludes that the complaint at most called into question the two members of the Compensation Committee and did not impugn the independence or disinterestedness of a majority of the board.
7. With respect to grants made to the outside directors, VC Strine considered the board to be interested without conducting any type of materiality analysis. He then held that the complaint did not state a claim as to these grants because the stockholder-approved plan provided for an automatic grant of 30,000 market priced options each year, as of the date of the annual meeting. Because the directors “took the good with the bad” in accordance to what the stockholders approved, no breach of fiduciary duty claim was stated.
Because of its overarching treatment of a variety of stock option scenarios, Desimone is likely to become the bellwether case for backdating analysis. The holding on director imputation of knowledge is also quite significant and potentially has far reaching implications, particularly because the questions of directors knew and when they knew it frequently create the dividing line between a care and loyalty claim.
A couple of recent cases have highlighted situations where beneficial ownership reporting by hedge funds is called into question, in one instance with a particularly draconian result – potential imprisonment.
The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York announced that the founder and manager of two hedge funds pleaded guilty to three counts of violating federal securities laws arising from the activities of his funds in acquiring substantial positions in the securities of two public companies. In addition to defrauding the funds’ investors about transactions that resulted in losses of $88 million, the manager was charged with failing to file on Schedule 13D to report an interest of 5% or more of one company’s stock (he and his funds controlled over 80 percent of the stock), and failing to file a Form 3 to report his beneficial interest of more than 10% in another company (while falsely reporting ownership of under 10% in a Schedule 13D).
The SEC also commenced a civil action in this case back in 2005 that is still pending. Actions such as this one should come as no surprise to those who have heard the SEC Staff publicly express the point that compliance with the beneficial ownership reporting requirements has been – and will remain – a high priority.
While the failure to file accurate beneficial ownership reports was obviously important for the markets in the common stock of the companies involved, the lack of accurate beneficial ownership information was also crucial for the manager to carry out his fraudulent scheme, as any reporting of his interests would have informed his investors that he was not acting in accordance with the funds’ investment policies. Alan Dye has blogged more about this case on his Section16.net Blog.
And Another Schedule 13D/G Action…
Recently, the Delaware Chancery Court addressed the situation of a hedge fund that reported its “investment only” intent on Schedule 13G when it was potentially considering the nomination of a short slate of directors to the company’s board. While the case of Openwave Systems Inc v. Harbinger Capital Partners principally involved the hedge fund’s failure to timely nominate its director candidates under Openwave’s advance notice bylaw provisions, the court took particular note of the fund’s status as a Schedule 13G filer in assessing whether it was really in a position to nominate its own directors within the required timeframes of the advance notice bylaw provisions, as well as in rejecting the fund’s allegation that the board of Openwave reduced the number of directors in response to Harbinger’s potential “threat.”
NASPP’s “15th Annual Conference”: Program Announced!
The full program – with over 40 panels! – for the NASPP Annual Conference was just announced. This conference brochure lists all the panels. Register today.
This year’s conference will be held at the San Francisco Marriott from October 10-12 – and already is on track to have well over 2000 attendees. Make your hotel reservations now before the hotel is sold out. With the October 9th pre-conference – “Tackling Your 2008 Compensation Disclosures: The 2nd Annual Proxy Disclosure Conference” – being so popular, this will happen very soon…
Starting this past Monday, non-US issuers were able to deregister from their ’34 reporting obligations if they met the requirements of the SEC’s new rules. As noted in this article on Dominic Jones’ IR Web Report, some foreign private issuers already have taken advantage of the new rules and headed out of the SEC’s door. In our “Foreign Private Issuers” Practice Area, we have posted plenty of memos on the SEC’s new rules.
A Wild Proxy Season: A Worst Case Scenario
As many of us weathered what amounted to another wild proxy season, have you ever thought about the worst case scenario? How about dissidents storming your headquarters! This happened back in January during a proxy “fight” for Competitive Technologies. As noted in this press release from the company, an ex-CEO and three of his associates arrived at the company’s headquarters and demanded entry because they believed they won the proxy fight. A few weeks later, the ex-CEO became the new CEO after the annual meeting was reconvened (and held at the AMEX) and the dissidents won the election.
Interestingly, one of the additional solicitation material filings filed by the dissident group – when the battle was raging – included a complaint letter sent to the SEC. While it’s common for opposing parties in proxy contests to privately send complaint letters to the SEC Staff, it’s not common to publicly file a complaint letter. So cheer up, your situation couldn’t have been as bad as this one…
Management Always Wins the Close Votes?
Some academic food for thought over at the Prawfs Blawg with this entry from Yair Listokin of Yale Law School. Yair’s work in progress investigates the theory that management wins “close” votes on proxy statement proposals more often then would be expected.
[Letters about “Scooter” Libby: As you may have read in the press, the Judge from the Scooter Libby sentencing hearing allowed the letters submitted to the court to be made publicly available; in this batch of the letters, the one on page 41 is from Jonathan Burks, the head of the SEC’s Office of Legislative Affairs – and the letter on page 57 is from SEC Chairman Cox.]
Not many companies have disclosed the lost corporate tax deductions caused by an executive’s personal use of aircraft, which often can result in some pretty sizable numbers. In this 30-minute podcast, Terry Kelley, Chairman & CEO of Gold Jets, provides some insight into issues related to personal use of corporate aircraft (see this 91Plus brochure and this letter that notes there may be disclosure issues relating to lost tax deductions), including:
– Can you provide a brief overview of the tax issues facing companies when they allow executives to use the corporate aircraft for personal use?
– The new disclosure rules say that you have to present the “incremental cost” of providing a benefit to the executive. I know that you have reviewed numerous proxies – what have you seen?
– What is 91Plus and how does it help companies and their executives?
Climate Change: The Time to Learn How It Impacts Your Practice is Now!
I really encourage you to catch at least one panel from next Tuesday’s complimentary webconference on TacklingGlobalWarming.com entitled: “Tackling Global Warming: Challenges for Boards and their Advisors.” There are quite a few disclosure, due diligence and other fiduciary duty issues raised by climate change – and not many corporate & securities practitioners are very familiar with them. If you can’t catch this program next Tuesday, each panel will be archived indefinitely (and still available for free).
To get a sense of the issues raised by climate change, check out a snapshot of how D&O insurance comes into play, as written up in the The D&O Diary Blog (and here is a follow-on blog). Note that next Tuesday’s Conference includes a panel on “Why You Need to Re-Examine Your D&O Insurance Policy.”
Another View: Why Have Audit Fees Risen So Much?
One of the primary reasons there is a battle over how much to reform the SEC’s and PCAOB’s internal controls rules is the rapid rise in audit fees. I was taken with last Friday’s opinion column by the President and CEO of SVB Financial Group, Kenneth Wilcox, in last Friday’s WSJ.
In his op-ed, Mr. Wilcox wondered: “My company is paying accountants five times more than it did three years ago. Why?” His response: “It turns out that only a diminishing portion of this increase is due to Sarbox.” Other factors driving the cost increase, he said, included “the significantly increased amount of time that audits are taking, and the much larger number of people that they involve.” FEI’s “Financial Reporting” Blog has commented on this op-ed recently.
On Tuesday, SEC Chair Cox testified that AS #5 will reduce internal controls compliance costs for smaller companies; PCAOB Chair Olson testified similarly. I haven’t yet been convinced that costs will drop significantly, as it seems to me that one cause of the high cost results from the dictates of Auditing Standard No. 3 regarding documentation and work papers, which has not been revised. I’m not sure why this standard wasn’t tweaked when AS #2 was replaced with AS #5 as they seem to go hand-in-hand. Then again, I’m not an accountant, so what do I know…
Learn more about what questions that you – and your audit committee – should be asking about the SEC’s and PCAOB’s new internal controls guidance in this upcoming webcast: “Internal Controls Update: AS #5, Management Reports and All that Jazz,” featuring John Huber, Linda Griggs and an expert from a Big Four firm.
Recently, there have been a few examples of why it’s important to know how to recognize an inadvertent investment company. A few weeks ago, the AFL-CIO wrote this letter to the SEC expressing concerns that if the Blackstone Group conducts its IPO, it should be required to register as an investment company.
Then Judge Easterbrook out of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals delivered this opinion in National Presto. The case involves some rather unusual facts (and includes some sharp judicial digs at the SEC) raising the issue of whether the company is an inadvertant investment company. National Presto had been ordered by the District Court to register as an investment company. After registering, the company reorganized its assets so that the amount of its assets was below the 40% trigger under Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the ’40 Act – and the SEC would not give its consent to deregistration. It is on this point that Judge Easterbrook takes the SEC to task, with some notable quotes.
I think the case is important beyond its ’40 Act findings because it reminds us that Staff positions (no-action letters and telephone interps and the like) are just that – courts may not necessarily follow them. Thanks to Sheldon Krause for pointing this case out and Keith Bishop for his ten cents!
Learn more in our “Inadvertent Investment Companies” Practice Area – including this new podcast with Rob Rosenblum of K&L Gates, who provides some insight into the issues involved with inadvertent investment companies, including:
– What is an “inadvertent investment company”?
– What are the findings of the National Presto case?
– How are the facts of that case different than what the AFL-CIO is alleging regarding Blackstone in its letter to the SEC?
– What should companies do if they think they might inadvertently be an investment company?
Course Materials: The Nasdaq Speaks – Latest Developments and Interpretations
Confusion Reigns: Has the SEC Decided to Support Investors in “Scheme” Liability Case?
According to this Saturday Washington Post article, the SEC has decided to throw its weight behind investors in a big-money dispute that could resolve whether shareholders can sue bankers who enabled their corporate clients to engage in fraud (today’s WSJ has a similar article, but as noted below, there is uncertainty as to whether this is true – and if so, exactly which case the SEC has decided to weigh in on). Here is an excerpt from the article:
“The Securities and Exchange Commission has asked the U.S. solicitor general to file court papers supporting investors in an upcoming Supreme Court case, an action that has not been made public. The agency’s decision follows intense lobbying by industry groups, unions and plaintiff lawyers, including well-known California attorney William S. Lerach.
The move is a significant victory for Lerach, who won $7.3 billion in settlements with banks and law firms that helped Enron disguise its financial problems. If the Supreme Court adopts the agency’s position, it could breathe new life into a stalled case filed by Enron shareholders against Merrill Lynch and Barclays Bank. But the SEC backing comes at a bittersweet time for Lerach, whose own future is in question because of government scrutiny.”
As PointofLaw.com points out, the article might be read several different ways (and SEC officials have declined to comment so far). Here is an excerpt from the commentary on that site:
“A reader suggests that the Washington Post article is actually talking about Stoneridge though the article does not mention that case by name. That is a plausible interpretation that would make the Washington Post article make more sense; the reporter may have been limited by the constraints of space and forced to leave out information such as the name of the case the SEC was planning to file a brief in, even as it mentions the larger Enron case. If the Solicitor General does not veto the SEC’s politically-motivated recommendation, the Stoneridge amicus brief would be due June 11.”
Last Tuesday, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit – in Stein v. KPMG, No. 06-4358 (2nd Cir. 2007) – vacated Judge Kaplan’s (ie. the trial court’s) assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over contract claims for attorney fees brought in a criminal tax case against KPMG, a non-party (see my blog on Judge Kaplan’s opinion). If it is found that DOJ violated the appellees’ due process rights by coercing the defendants, it is possible that the indictments will be dismissed. We have posted a copy of the Steinopinion in our “Advancement of Legal Fees” Practice Area.
Here is some analysis from Keith Bishop: The Court of Appeals didn’t reject Judge Kaplan’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment conclusions – but it did not agree with his pro-active attempt to exercise ancillary jurisdiction. Basically, the Second Circuit rejected Judge Kaplan’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the criminal defendant’s implied (and in one case) express claims for payment of legal expenses. The Court of Appeals left open the possibility of dismissal of the claims, stating “Dismissal of an indictment for Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations is always an available remedy.” However, it also suggested other action such as ordering “cessation of such conduct” was possible. The Second Circuit also noted the apparent inconsistency between the Thompson Memorandum’s focus on voluntary payment of legal fees and Judge Kaplan’s assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over claims by the defendants to payment.
By the way, this case emanates from the same type of fishy tax shelters that have now landed Ernst & Young in trouble – see this related article and here is the indictment.
[Friday Funnies – Check out Will Ferrell’s short takes on FunnyorDie.com.]
Failure to Provide Evidence of Loss Causation Precludes Class Certification
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit – in Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Holland – raised the bar in federal securities fraud litigation by requiring plaintiffs to come forward with evidence of loss causation in order to obtain class certification, particularly where investor losses could be attributed to multiple factors unrelated to the alleged fraud. We have posted memos regarding this decision in our “Securities Litigation” Practice Area.
FASB Plans Project to Simplify Hedge Accounting
Recently, the FASB voted to simplify FAS 133, “Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.” According to this CFO.com article, FASB will replace current assessment and testing mandates with a fair-value approach.
We are honored to welcome David Lynn to our team. Dave left his post as Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance on Friday, after serving in that capacity for the past four years. This was his second tour of duty in Corp Fin, having spent some time at WilmerHale in between.
In addition to helping implement the record amount of rulemaking that occurred in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, Dave was one of the key point persons on the SEC’s proxy disclosure rules and, most recently, has been primarily responsible for the overhaul of the SEC’s Telephone Interpretations Manual. Dave and I worked together at the SEC a while back and I couldn’t imagine a better partner to spend the next few decades churning out the news and analysis for you on this site.
The “Skinny” on Dave
So what will Dave be doing? Initially, Dave will be providing badly needed help on TheCorporateCounsel.net, serving as an Editor of the site along with me – and even splitting blogging duties starting next week. Dave actually ran an internal blog in Corp Fin so he is not afraid to stick his neck out. Dave also will be helping out on CompensationStandards.com, run our secret special project division and weigh in with his ten cents on some of our print publications, like The Corporate Counsel.
As evident from his biography, Dave is a man of multiple talents. Who else could come up a “going away” speech in the form of a CD&A (actually, several CD&As). And Dave will be able to help all of us decipher some of the more interesting comment letters that get filed with the SEC. Dave can be reached at dave@thecorporatecounsel.net. Let him know how much you want to love him…
The Rise of the “B’s”
In our “Credit Ratings, Arrangements, & Facilities” Practice Area, we have posted a report on the rise in numbers of companies in the US with “B” credit rated debt. It notes the dramatic decline in percentage of companies with AAA/AA rated debt, as well as the percentage of companies with “B” rated debt that have filed for bankruptcy.
Recently there has been some movement in the NYSE’s rulemaking to amend Rule 452 to eliminate broker non-votes in the director election context. First, there was some discussion on the topic during last week’s proxy process roundtable at the SEC. Jim McRitchie does a good job of summarizing what the roundtable participants’ positions have been, noting on CorpGov.net that the recommendations on broker voting appear to have broken into three categories:
– Stick with NYSE’s proposal to eliminate broker voting for directors – One variation would only eliminate it where there is an active no-vote campaign.
– Proportional voting – Where the broker uses voting instructions given by other retail investors to determine how to vote uninstructed shares. There were several variations on this theme.
– Client-directed voting – Under this framework from American Express’s Stephen Norman, retail investors would give general voting instructions to their broker when signing brokerage account agreements.
Second, as noted in this WSJ article, the mutual-fund industry got its wish and the NYSE has amended its proposal so that mutual funds would be excluded from any change in its rules (according to the article, after reviewing information supplied by the fund industry, the NYSE said its advisory panel concluded that mutual funds are different enough “that it was appropriate to treat such companies differently”).
Finally, some investors are demanding that this rulemaking go forward. Below is an excerpt from the ISS “Corporate Governance Blog” on this topic:
A close director vote at CVS/Caremark is fueling investor demands for the Securities and Exchange Commission to approve a New York Stock Exchange rule change to bar brokers from casting uninstructed investor votes in board elections.
“I think this vote will be Exhibit A in the deliberations of the NYSE and the SEC in the coming weeks,” said William Patterson, executive director of the CtW Investment Group, which has urged CVS/Caremark to request the resignation of director Roger Headrick. The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) plans to hold a conference call on May 29 to address the issue, Patterson said.
Headrick received 606.585 million “for” votes and 453.175 million “against” votes at company’s May 9 meeting, CVS/Caremark said in a regulatory filing. Based on those numbers, Headrick received a 42.7 percent negative vote. However, the vote results for five other proxy items reveal that 264.762 million “broker non-votes” were cast. If those broker votes are subtracted from Headrick’s “for” total, then the “against” votes would amount to 57 percent of the remaining votes.
The stakes are higher at CVS/Caremark, because the company, like scores of other large firms, now requires that board nominees receive a majority of votes cast in uncontested elections to be elected. “Before this proxy season, all of this was theoretical,” Patterson told Governance Weekly. At CVS/Caremark, “the broker votes were decisive and that’s clear.”
CtW, which manages funds for the Change to Win labor federation, targeted Headrick and a second former Caremark Rx board member over their handling of the pharmacy benefits company’s recent sale to CVS, the largest U.S. drug-store chain. In its regulatory filing, CVS/Caremark said “votes ‘against’ a director’s election count as a vote cast, but ‘abstentions’ and ‘broker non-votes’ do not count as a vote cast with respect to that director’s election.”
However, the vote results suggest that some of those broker votes were counted in Headrick’s election. The company’s filing indicates that a total of 1,059.76 million shares were cast either “for” or “against” Headrick. CVS/Caremark also reported that the total votes cast at the meeting were 1,091.671 million, or 31.91 million more. The vote results for five other proxy items indicate that there were 264.762 million broker votes, so it appears that 232.852 million broker votes were counted in Headrick’s election for his vote total to reach 1,059.76 million. Those 232.852 million votes exceed the 153.41 million difference between the “for” and “against” votes that the company reported that Headrick received.
Company spokeswoman Carolyn Castel told Dow Jones Newswires that the “broker votes were spread among the votes cast for and against the directors.” However, Patterson and other investor advocates contend that broker votes are routinely cast in favor of management nominees in uncontested elections. The Council of Institutional Investors has said these votes “taint the integrity of the proxy voting process by stuffing ballot boxes for management.”
Goldman Launches an Unregistered Stock Trading System
As noted in this recent WSJ article, Goldman Sachs has joined the ranks of those launching an unregistered securities trading exchange with its “GS TRue” platform. Here are one blogger’s thoughts on this development – and here are two excerpts from the WSJ article:
“Goldman Sachs Group Inc. ranks as the most profitable securities firm on Wall Street — reflecting its mastery of trading on the world’s public markets. Now Goldman is turning that franchise on its head, creating its own private system to trade the stocks of companies that don’t want the scrutiny and regulatory burdens of going public.
The new system, GS TRuE — short for Goldman Sachs Tradable Unregistered Equity — was announced two weeks ago and made its debut on Monday with an $880 million sale of a 15% stake in Oaktree Capital Management LLC, an alternative-investment manager. It is the first of several new, private exchanges like these being considered by Wall Street firms and others. Nasdaq is also planning its own new market for smaller, unregistered securities.
These markets will generally be closed to individual investors. For instance, Goldman’s market is open only to large institutional investors with assets of more than $100 million. That is because the stocks traded on GS TRuE aren’t registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and issuers aren’t subject to SEC regulations designed to protect individual investors.
It represents the latest step in the creeping exclusion of individual investors from a growing proportion of financial-market activity. For instance, giant private-equity firms are busy buying public companies and delisting them from stock exchanges. The growing importance of hedge funds — which are generally limited to wealthy investors, institutions and endowments — also excludes individuals.”
“Bankers at rival firms — many of which are developing similar systems — predict that there will be consolidation among the different platforms. “History in other markets would indicate that this will converge into a single platform,” said Daniel Simkowitz, a managing director in capital markets at Morgan Stanley, which advised Oaktree on the issue.
Indeed, Nasdaq Stock Market Inc. is in the home stretch of getting approval for a similar unregistered trading facility for smaller companies called Portal. Another securities firm, Friedman, Billings, Ramsey Group Inc., has sold unregistered stock for numerous companies in real estate, energy and lodging.
Goldman executives said one reason they launched their own system solo, without asking other rival securities firms to participate, was to insure control over the number of investors in any particular security. That is crucial, they said, because any company that goes over 499 investors must register as a public company.
That 499-investor limit, said one executive of a top private-equity firm, is one reason why such buyout firms aren’t likely to rush pell-mell into this type of new issue for their portfolio companies. The buyout firms want to attract far more investors to make sure they get the best prices for their stock, he explained.”
As expected, Evelyn Davis was all entertainment during the SEC’s third proxy process roundtable on Friday. She is a “must see” on the video archive (her panel kicks off at the 1:22 mark; Evelyn starts at 1:27, but its worth hearing the calm voices of the other speakers before her for context). Note that the SEC upgraded the display of its open meetings from audio to video recently.
Marty Dunn did a fair job of keeping Evelyn under control – but she did get a few good ones in, such as screaming that she is prettier than Nell Minow. The SEC has posted a transcript of the first roundtable as well as briefing papers and panel statements for all three.
Private Equity M&A Nuggets
We have posted a transcript from the popular DealLawyers.com webcast: “Private Equity M&A Nuggets.”
Subprime Lending Developments
In this podcast, Stephen Ornstein of Thacher Proffitt & Wood provides some insight into what is happening in the subprime lending market, including:
– What are the latest developments in the subprime lending area?
– How bad is this market right now?
– For those companies that originate, purchase and underwrite securitizations with subprime loans, what is their respective primary exposure in today’s markets and how do these parties mitigate risk?
