If you’re a public company director looking to put a real crimp in your future career prospects, it looks like adopting a poison pill is a pretty good way to do it. In a recent Business Law Prof blog, Akron U’s Stefan Padfield flagged a new study that says directors who vote to adopt a poison pill pay a significant price. Here’s the abstract:
We examine the labor market consequences for directors who adopt poison pills. Directors who become associated with pill adoption experience significant decreases in vote margins and increases in termination rates across all their directorships. They also experience a decrease in the likelihood of new board appointments. Firms have positive abnormal stock price reactions when pill-associated directors die or depart their boards, compared to zero abnormal returns for other directors.
Further tests indicate that these adverse consequences accrue primarily to directors involved in the adoption of pills at seasoned firms and not at young firms. We conclude that directors who become associated with poison pill adoption suffer a decrease in the value of their services, and that the director labor market thus plays an important role in firms’ governance.
The study suggests that the absence of any adverse effect on directors who put pills in place at emerging companies may reflect the market’s perception that takeover defenses are positive for young firms and negative for more seasoned ones.
PCAOB: Board Seat Drama Culminates in SEC Shake-Up
Last month, Broc blogged about the controversy over Kathleen Hamm’s seat on the board of the PCAOB. To make a long story short, Hamm wanted to be reappointed to the Board, but according to this article by MarketWatch.com’s Francine McKenna, the SEC seemed to have other ideas. Last week, the CII sent a letter to the SEC citing Francine’s article & endorsing Hamm’s reappointment.
The plot thickened late Friday afternoon when the SEC issued a press release announcing that Hamm would leave the PCAOB board when her current term expires. That was followed by another release announcing that White House staffer Rebekah Goshorn Jurata would take Hamm’s place on the board.
If the replacement of the reportedly “Democrat-aligned” Hamm with a Trump Administration insider wasn’t enough to raise eyebrows, the SEC’s second press release went on to announce that Commissioner Hester Peirce – who is, to say the least, not a fan of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act – would “lead the Commission’s coordination efforts with the Board of the PCAOB.”
Any hopes that releasing the news about the shake-up late on the Friday before a holiday weekend would limit media attention on the PCAOB were likely dashed yesterday when the WSJ published an article detailing a whistleblower’s allegations that the PCAOB’s work has been slowed by “board infighting, multiple senior staff departures, and allegations that the chairman has created a “’sense of fear.'”
Whistleblowers: Big Changes in SEC’s Program On the Way?
According to this recent AP report, the SEC is quietly moving toward adopting some potentially significant changes in its whistleblower program. Here’s an excerpt:
The proposal would give the SEC discretion to set the smallest and largest cash awards to whistleblowers, among other changes. Critics say that change would likely discourage employees from reporting major frauds by lowering the chances of a huge payout. The payment for successful cases is now 10% to 30% of fines or restitution collected by the agency — which means the bigger the fraud, the larger the bounty.
The SEC also wants to impose new requirements for filing a whistleblower complaint. To receive legal protection from the SEC against retaliation — a core concern for people risking their careers and livelihoods — a whistleblower would have to report violations in writing, rather than the oral disclosures now permitted at the SEC and other federal agencies.
Liz blogged about the proposal to amend the whistleblower rules when the SEC initially made it in June 2018, but now that it appears to be close to adoption, it has prompted the usual reaction from the usual suspects. Whistleblower advocates contend the changes would have calamitous results, while the AP story quotes the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as saying that the proposal is a “small but nonetheless important step” toward improvement.
Last week, NYC Comptroller Scott Stringer announced an initiative calling for companies to adopt a corporate version of the NFL’s “Rooney Rule” in order to promote gender & ethnic diversity in the boardroom. Here’s an excerpt from the Comptroller’s press release:
At the annual Bureau of Asset Management (BAM) “Emerging and MWBE Manager” conference, New York City Comptroller Scott M. Stringer today launched the third stage of the groundbreaking Boardroom Accountability Project with a new first-in-the-nation initiative calling on companies to adopt a policy requiring the consideration of both women and people of color for every open board seat and for CEO appointments, a version of the “Rooney Rule” pioneered by the National Football League (NFL). The new initiative is the cornerstone of the Comptroller’s Boardroom Accountability Project, a campaign launched in 2014 which seeks to make boards more diverse, independent, and climate competent.
The Comptroller launched this initiative by sending a letter to 56 S&P 500 companies that do not currently have a Rooney Rule policy requesting them to implement one. The press release indicates that the Comptroller will file shareholder proposals at companies “with lack of apparent racial diversity at the highest levels.”
Since the Comptroller is pressing for a corporate Rooney Rule, I wondered if there was data on how the NFL’s Rooney Rule has played out in terms of promoting diversity. I came across this recent article from “TheUndefeated.com” which says that the results are a mixed bag. Minority candidates are getting more shots at head coaching positions, but the results suggest that they’re put in a position to succeed less frequently than white coaches, and that teams give them the axe more quickly. It’s also worth noting that, despite the Rooney Rule, 7 of the 8 head coaching vacancies in the NFL during the past offseason were filled by white dudes.
I have a problem with the methodology that the article applies to its Rooney Rule analysis. The Cleveland Browns’ hiring & firing of Romeo Crennel & Hue Jackson during the period were included in the sample, which I really think should’ve been limited to professional football teams. Besides, as we Cleveland fans are in the process of finding out once again this season, nobody can question the fact that the Browns are an equal opportunity pit of despair.
Conflict Minerals: GAO Says 2018 Reports Were More of the Same
The GAO recently completed its annual conflict minerals review as required by Dodd Frank. Here’s an excerpt from this GAO report highlighting its results:
Companies’ conflict minerals disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2018 were, in general, similar in number and content to disclosures filed in the prior 2 years. In 2018, 1,117 companies filed conflict minerals disclosures—about the same number as in 2017 and 2016. The percentage of companies that reported on their efforts to determine the source of minerals in their products through supply chain data collection (country-of-origin inquiries) was also similar to percentages in those 2 prior years.
As a result of the inquiries they conducted, an estimated 56 percent of the companies reported whether the conflict minerals in their products came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or any of the countries adjoining it—similar to the estimated 53 and 49 percent in the prior 2 years. The percentage of companies able to make such a determination significantly increased between 2014 and 2015, and has since leveled off.
Tomorrow’s Webcast: “Sustainability Reporting – Small & Mid-Cap Perspectives”
Tune in tomorrow for the webcast – “Sustainability Reporting: Small & Mid-Cap Perspectives” – to hear White & Case’s Maia Gez, Elm Sustainability Partners’ Lawrence Heim, Ballard Spahr’s Katayun Jaffari and Toro’s Angie Snavely discuss sustainability trends among small & mid-caps – and how companies with limited resources can get a sustainability initiative off the ground.
Yesterday, the SEC announced that it had adopted final rules permitting all companies to gauge market interest in a possible initial public offering or other registered securities offering to “test the waters” by reaching out to certain institutional investors before filing a registration statement. Previously, only EGCs had been able to engage in this activity under applicable provisions of the JOBS Act. Here’s an excerpt from the fact sheet included in the press release summarizing the rule:
Securities Act Rule 163B will permit any issuer, or any person authorized to act on its behalf, to engage in oral or written communications with potential investors that are, or are reasonably believed to be, QIBs or IAIs, either prior to or following the filing of a registration statement, to determine whether such investors might have an interest in a contemplated registered securities offering. The rule is non-exclusive and an issuer may rely on other Securities Act communications rules or exemptions when determining how, when, and what to communicate about a contemplated securities offering.
Under the rule:
– there are no filing or legending requirements;
– the communications are deemed “offers”; and
– issuers subject to Regulation FD will need to consider whether any information in a test-the-waters communication would trigger disclosure obligations under Regulation FD or whether an exemption under Regulation FD would apply.
In a public statement accompanying the announcement of the new rule, SEC Chair Jay Clayton said that it will allow issuers to “better identify information that is important to investors and enhance the ability to conduct a successful registered offering, ultimately providing both Main Street and institutional investors with more opportunities to invest in public companies that, in turn, provide ongoing disclosures to their investors.” The new rule will become effective 60 days after publication in the federal register.
Auditor Independence: Flurry of SEC & PCAOB Enforcement
Earlier this week, the Division of Enforcement announced a settled enforcement proceeding with PwC arising out of alleged violations of the SEC’s independence rules. PwC’s Mexican affiliate was also sanctioned for independence violations by the PCAOB in August. The SEC’s action against PwC comes on the heels of another settled proceeding late last month involving RSM US LLP. Earlier this month, the PCAOB sanctioned another two accounting firms for independence violations.
So, what’s with this recent spate of enforcement proceedings? It’s hard to say for sure, but this may have been coming for quite some time. Broc blogged last year that Lynn Turner reported that there was “trouble brewing” at the PCAOB & SEC over independence issues. The PCAOB apparently discovered a number of independence issues in its 2016 inspection reports, and noted that many of these were not reported to the audit committee as required under PCAOB rules.
Earlier this year, the PCAOB came out with additional guidance on what the rules require auditors to communicate to audit committees when they identify independence issues, and the failure to comply with independence disclosure requirements is at the heart of both the PCAOB & SEC enforcement proceedings involving PwC.
PCAOB: Board Laying Low in Wake of KPMG Scandal?
Speaking of the PCAOB, according to this article by MarketWatch.com’s Francine McKenna, the PCAOB continues to be in transition in the wake of the KPMG scandal – and its board has apparently decided to keep a very low profile, even if that appears to violate the PCAOB’s bylaws:
The PCAOB board is staying out of the public eye in 2019, in violation of bylaws established by the law that created the PCAOB, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The law requires the PCAOB to hold at least one public meeting of its governing board each calendar quarter. However, the PCAOB board has held no public meetings of its governing board since December 20, 2018.
MarketWatch asked the PCAOB to comment on its apparent lack of compliance with its bylaws regarding open board meetings. A PCAOB spokeswoman told MarketWatch, “Consistent with long-standing practice, the Board holds open meetings to take action on business such as standard-setting or voting on its budget and strategic plan. We expect to hold two open meetings in the coming months to address our 2020 budget and a proposed concept release related to our quality control standards.”
Even by current D.C. standards, the PCAOB’s response leaves much to be desired. It’s not a denial, and it isn’t even a “non-denial denial.” By the way, it isn’t just the board – the article says that the PCAOB’s two outside advisory groups haven’t met in 2019 either.
I have a friend who keeps trying to persuade me to buy a Tesla. He owns one, and I guess there’s some kind of bounty the company pays to Tesla owners who convince other people to pony up for their own E-Z-Go on steroids. I’ve told him he’s barking up the wrong tree. I’ve always driven a beater. My current ride is a 2012 Chevy Equinox with 140,000 miles on it. It goes through 2 quarts of oil a month and I’m still determined to keep it for at least another couple of years.
But I also confess that even if I was in the market for a new car, I just can’t see buying one from Elon Musk. The guy’s antics really rub me the wrong way. So it pains me to have to blog about him again – but I do. This time, Elon and his board have gotten themselves sideways with Tesla shareholders in the Delaware Chancery Court, and the issue isn’t his tweets, it’s his comp.
Last year, the Tesla board – and shareholders – signed-off on a pay deal that would provide Musk with a potentially gargantuan payout if its stock hit some very aggressive market cap & operational goals. How gargantuan? Try more than $50 billion. A shareholder subsequently filed a lawsuit against Musk and the Tesla board alleging that the comp award was a breach of fiduciary duty.
By way of background, the Chancery Court decided last year that Musk was a “controlling shareholder” of Tesla in an unrelated case, despite the fact that he owned only around 20% of the stock. So, for purposes of the motion to dismiss filed in this case, the parties treated him as if he was a controller. That complicates things considerably, because the default standard for reviewing for transactions between a company and its controlling shareholder – even comp decisions – is the demanding “entire fairness” standard and not the deferential business judgment rule.
Delaware has laid out a path to the business judgment rule for these transactions, but in his 40-page opinion denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Vice Chancellor Slights found that despite the approval of the comp award by Tesla’s shareholders, the process wasn’t good enough to allow this award to make the cut:
Had the Board ensured from the outset of “substantive economic negotiations” that both of Tesla’s qualified decision makers—an independent, fully functioning Compensation Committee and the minority stockholders—were able to engage in an informed review of the Award, followed by meaningful (i.e., otherwise uncoerced) approval, the Court’s reflexive suspicion of Musk’s coercive influence over the outcome would be abated. Business judgment deference at the pleadings stage would then be justified. Plaintiff has well pled, however, that the Board level review was not divorced from Musk’s influence. Entire fairness, therefore, must abide.
The Vice Chancellor held that the defendants were unable to establish that the award was entirely fair at the pleading stage, so he declined to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty & unjust enrichment claims. That probably means I’ll have to blog about Musk again at some point in the not-too-distant future. Lucky me.
SEC Settles Nissan Fraud Charges: Don’t Have the CEO Set Their Own Pay!
It’s been a big week for CEO compensation stories. Here’s something Liz blogged earlier this week on CompensationStandards.com: Wow. Broc & I have blogged a couple of times over the past year about the SEC’s Nissan investigation, which (among other reasons) is of interest because Nissan is a Japanese company, and also because of the bold efforts people took to conceal former CEO Carlos Ghosn’s pay.
Yesterday, the SEC announced that it settled Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 fraud charges with Nissan, Ghosn, and a former director/HR exec for omitting $140 worth of Ghosn’s compensation from Japanese securities filings – which were published in the US because the company’s securities trade as ADRs on the OTC – and which required information about executive pay. Allegedly, Ghosn went to all this effort to restructure & hide his pay because he was worried that people would criticize the amounts (pro tip: at least in the US, that’s a hint that you’re probably required to disclose the info).
Nissan is ponying up $15 million – while the individuals are getting off with civil fines of $1 million and $100k. Seems like a pretty good deal for those two, based on the allegations in the SEC’s complaint against them – e.g., Ghosn first brainstormed ways to conceal part of his pay by paying it through Nissan-related entities…when that didn’t work, he started entering into secret contracts with employees and executing backdated letters for LTIP awards, and decided that “postponing” pay (along with creative accounting) would get him around the disclosure obligations.
Initially, one problem here for the company might have been faulty internal controls. But according to the SEC’s complaint against the company, the fatal blow was that because Nissan had specifically delegated to Ghosn the authority to set individual pay arrangements – including his own! – he was acting within the scope of his employment when he intentionally misled investors, and the company was liable under the principles of respondeat superior. We can complain all we want about the burdensome listing rules here, but maybe they’re saving some companies from themselves…
Audit Reports: What Does Auditor Tenure Disclosure Look Like?
This Audit Analytics blog discusses the disclosures that accounting firms are including in their audit reports in response to the relatively new requirement to disclosure their tenure with a particular company. The blog says that although the PCAOB has provided guidance on determining & reporting tenure, “auditors have discretion regarding exactly what and how the information is disclosed, resulting in substantial variation in disclosures.”
Having reviewed the blog, I can assure you that auditors have used their discretion to ensure that all versions of tenure disclosure are extremely boring.
This Stinson blog highlights rule changes that could prompt a few tweaks to D&O questionnaires. Specifically, the blog notes that:
– Companies can now rely on Section 16 filings & written representations to determine whether an insider has delinquencies. As a result, companies may ask whether all required Section 16 reports have been filed on EDGAR instead of asking whether all of those reports have been provided to it.
– If Nasdaq’s proposed changes to the definition of the term “family member” are approved, Nasdaq-listed companies may want tweak the definition contained in their D&O questionnaires to reflect the changes.
The blog also urges companies to be cautious about eliminating references to Section 162(m) in D&O questionnaires for compensation committee members unless it’s clear that the committee isn’t required to administer any compensation arrangements under the transition rule.
Stinson’s blog is a reminder that although it may seem like proxy season just ended, it’s actually right around the corner. And to help you get ready, we’ve already scheduled our “Pat McGurn’s Forecast for 2020 Proxy Season” webcast for January 16th.
Today’s Open Commission Meeting: Cancelled
The SEC has cancelled the open meeting that it had previously scheduled for today to consider, among other things, adopting its “test the waters” for all proposal. No word on rescheduling yet.
I don’t know if this had anything to do with the decision to cancel the meeting, but all 5 Commissioners were grilled for several hours yesterday by the House Financial Services Committee. Committee Chair Maxine Waters (D – Cal.) opened the hearing with a statement that accused the SEC of “not fulfilling its mission as Wall Street’s cop.” No doubt a good time was had by all.
ESG: Investors Want Companies to Align with Paris Climate Goals
According to this Ceres press release, a group of 200 socially conscious institutional investors with more than $6.5 trillion in AUM sent a letter to 47 large public companies asking them to align their climate change lobbying activities with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global temperature increase to less than 2° C and pursue efforts to hold it at 1.5° C.
The group’s letter doesn’t just address the lobbying activities of the individual companies – it also calls upon them to review those of any trade associations to which they belong and engage with the organization if its activities are inconsistent with the Paris Agreement’s goals. If companies are unable to persuade the association to modify its position, then the signatories ask that they “consider taking the steps necessary to disassociate your company from these policies.”
This SEC Institute blog flags a recent CFA Institute member survey addressing quarterly reporting & ESG disclosure. This excerpt says that quarterly reports are more important to investors than earnings releases, and that those reports & releases should be provided simultaneously:
The majority of survey respondents state that investors heavily rely on earnings releases because they are generally issued before quarterly financial reports. Respondents, however, indicate that quarterly reports remain more important to investors than earnings releases.
These quarterly reports provide a structured information set that follows accounting standards and regulatory guidelines and include incremental financial statement disclosures and management discussion and analysis. In addition, quarterly reports offer greater investor protections as they are certified by the officers of the company, subject companies to greater legal liability, and are reviewed by company auditors.
As for timing, the majority of respondents believe quarterly reports and earnings releases should be provided simultaneously because this would reduce the significant amount of time spent reconciling the contents of earnings releases with those of quarterly reports as well as ensure that investors can ask better questions during earnings calls by having access to the more detailed information contained in the quarterly report. Roundtable participants agree with these positions.
I understand why investors might like earnings releases & SEC reports to hit simultaneously, but I think many lawyers would say that idea is a non-starter. The problem is that earnings calls can go in all sorts of directions, and a lot of companies want to have the opportunity to take a last look at their draft filings make sure that all topics addressed in the call are appropriately addressed in what gets filed with the SEC. If they’re not, companies risk hearing about it in a Staff comment.
By the way, the survey also says that investors have no taste whatsoever for alternatives to 10-Q reporting or less frequent reports, and want companies to continue to provide quarterly earnings guidance.
When it comes to ESG reporting, the survey says that investors are for it, but because ESG means different things to different people, securities regulators need to provide uniform standards in order for that disclosure to be meaningful.
SEC Enforcement: Who Needs a CFO When You Have a POA?
Every now and again you stumble across an SEC enforcement proceeding that can only be described as “goofy.” I think the recently announced action against former Viking Energy CEO Tom Simeo easily qualifies for that description. According to the SEC’s press release announcing the litigation, the CEO “created the false impression to the public that Viking had an experienced financial professional involved in its operations and financial reporting as its CFO, when in reality, the Company had no CFO.”
At one point, the company apparently did appoint Guangfang “Cecile” Yang as its CFO, but the SEC alleges that there’s no evidence that she actually functioned as CFO “from at least November 2014 through Yang’s purported resignation in July 2016.” While the company didn’t actually have a CFO, according to the SEC’s complaint, the CEO did have something else:
One day after her appointment as Viking’s CFO, Yang also executed a power of attorney in favor of Simeo, authorizing Simeo to affix Yang’s signature to any and all documents – including filings with the SEC – that Yang was required to review and sign as Viking’s CFO and board member. The Company never disclosed in its filings that Yang had executed a power of attorney in favor of Simeo.
Simeo allegedly put that POA to good use, liberally affixing the purported CFO’s signature to various SEC filings & certifications. For some reason, the SEC appears to have found that troubling. . . .
Transcript: “Secrets of the Corporate Secretary Department”
We’ve posted the transcript for our recent webcast: “Secrets of the Corporate Secretary Department.”
Tomorrow morning, the House Financial Services Committee will hold an oversight hearing on the SEC in which all 5 SEC Commissioners will participate. If nothing else, the logistics of that hearing should be interesting. According to this Committee memorandum, here’s some of what’s on the agenda:
– The growth in private markets v. public markets
– Public company ESG disclosures
– The impact of the Supreme Court’s Kokesh decision on enforcement actions
– Application of the securities laws to cryptocurrencies
Although not of professional interest to most of our members, the SEC’s fiduciary rule is also on the agenda, & that may set off some fireworks.
About Those Private Markets. . .
It isn’t just Congress that’s interested in the growth of private v. public securities markets. According to this Reuters article, the continuing growth of private securities markets is something that’s concerning SEC Chair Jay Clayton as well:
“Why are people waiting so long to access capital from our public markets?” Clayton said. “Is it because there’s so much capital in the private markets or are we too short-term oriented, (is there) too much cost associated with going public?” Companies traditionally went public roughly six years after founding. Now, they often are not coming to market until 10 to 12 years after they were created, analysts said.
The NYT’s recent article on the impact of Airbnb’s delay in going public on its employee option-holders illustrates some of the real world consequences of companies deciding to postpone IPOs.
IPOs: VCs Eyeing “Direct Listing” Alternative
We’ve blogged about the potential of “direct listings” as an alternative to IPOs – and a couple of high-profile unicorns have already opted to take this path in lieu of an IPO. Now this “Axios Pro Rata” article says that another important constituency is taking a hard look at direct listings:
Venture capital’s call for more direct listings is growing louder, with a group of big-name investors and tech company executives expected to attend a private, invite-only “symposium” on the matter next month at a hotel in San Francisco. Among those expected to speak are Benchmark’s Bill Gurley, who’s been banging this drum for a while, Sequoia Capital’s Mike Moritz, who just write about direct listings in the FT, and Spotify CFO Barry McCarthy, whose company went public via a direct listing last year.
Why it matters is that there’s a growing investor consensus that the traditional VC-backed IPO process is antiquated and broken — too often benefiting a high-net-worth bank clients and a small pool of mutual and hedge funds, at the expense of issuers.
Big-time investment banks haven’t exactly covered themselves in glory with some recent traditional IPO filings, so if the VCs calling the shots on many deals revolt, the IPO process could be in for a big shake-up.
With everybody debating big picture issues like corporate purpose & stakeholder v. shareholder interests, this “Ethical Boardroom” article by Harvard’s Stephen Davis is a reminder that when it comes to good governance, there are more fundamental issues that need to be addressed – like making sure directors have the information they need to do their jobs.
The article points out that directors are “on the short end of a massive information imbalance.” They’re entirely dependent on management for their information flow, and even when they retain outside advisors, those advisors may be primarily loyal to management. This disparity gives management a routine advantage in influencing what gets on the board’s agenda and how matters are addressed. This excerpt says that the solution to this information imbalance may be an independent staff serving only the board:
Cementing the information imbalance is the fact that the typical company board has no everyday dedicated staff. Instead, directors rely on an executive – usually a company secretary or general counsel – who is accountable to and works for management. These officers are often the silent heroes of corporate life, as they attend to multiple, sometimes conflicting, constituencies and do so with high ethics and professionalism.
But make no mistake: they are not employed by and for the board. Indeed, outside observers would find it hard to fathom how companies go to such lengths to recruit great independent directors – only to make them largely dependent for help on the team they are supposed to oversee.
One of the interesting things that the article points out is that some companies have taken steps in this direction – although most of them appear to have done so in response to massive scandals. In that regard, in the wake of the Carlos Ghosn scandal, Nissan announced that it would establish an “office of the board” to improve the board’s ability to access information independently.
LIBOR Transition: FASB Exposure Draft Would Ease Accounting Burden
This recent blog from Stinson’s Steve Quinlivan flags a new FASB exposure draft that would make life a little easier when it comes to accounting for the impact of the upcoming elimination of LIBOR. Why should you care? Well, here’s an excerpt about the accounting hurdles companies could face absent the proposed relief:
Without any relief by FASB any contract modifications resulting from contract modification to implement a new reference rate would be required to be evaluated in determining whether the modifications result in the establishment of new contracts or the continuation of existing contracts. The application of existing accounting standards on modifications could be costly and burdensome due to the significant volume of affected contracts and the compressed time frame for making contract modifications.
In addition, changes in a reference rate could disallow the application of certain hedge accounting guidance, and certain hedge relationships may not qualify as highly effective during the period of the market-wide transition to a replacement rate. The inability to apply hedge accounting because of reference rate reform would result in financial reporting outcomes that would not reflect entities’ intended hedging strategies when those strategies continue to operate as effective hedges.
The proposed ASU would simplify accounting analyses under current GAAP for contract modifications if qualifying criteria are met & would allow hedging relationships to continue without de-designation as a result of certain LIBOR reform-related changes in their critical terms.
The Martin Act Gets Its Claws Sharpened
I’ve previously blogged about New York’s formidable Martin Act, which the NY AG uses as the basis to investigate and prosecute . . . well . . . just about anything. Last year, the statute had its claws trimmed when the NY Court of Appeals pared back its limitations period for non-scienter based fraud claims from 6 years to 3 years. But this New York Law Journal article reports that last month, NY Governor Andrew Cuomo signed legislation that essentially undid the Court’s decision & restored the 6 year statute of limitations.
Last month, Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine co-authored a NYT opinion piece about the failure of retirement & index funds to approach voting & corporate governance issues with the needs of their own investors – the workers who invest their retirement savings with them – in mind. Here’s an excerpt:
Growing inequality and stagnant wages are forcing a much-needed debate about our corporate governance system. Are corporations producing returns only for stockholders? Or are they also creating quality jobs in a way that is environmentally responsible, fair to consumers and sustainable? Those same corporations recognize that things are badly out of balance. Businesses are making record profits, but workers are not sharing in those gains.
This discussion is necessary. But an essential player is missing from the debate: large institutional investors. For most Americans, their participation in the stock market is limited to the money they have invested in mutual funds to finance retirement, usually in 401(k) accounts through their employers. These worker-investors do not get to vote the shares that they indirectly hold in American public companies at those companies’ annual meetings. Rather, the institutions managing the mutual funds do.
Institutional investors elect corporate boards. Institutional investors vote on whether to sell the company and on nominations for new directors, and whether to support proposed compensation packages for executives. At the average S. & P. 500 company, the 15 largest institutional investors own over half the shares, effectively determining the outcomes of shareholder votes. And the top four stockholders control over 20 percent.
What this all means is that corporate governance reform will be effective only if institutional investors use their voting power properly. Corporate boards will not value the fair treatment of workers or avoid shortcuts that harm the environment and consumers if the institutional investors that elect them do not support them in doing the right thing. And they are unlikely to end the recent surge in stock buybacks as long as there is pressure from institutional investors for immediate returns.
Among other things, Strine and his co-author, Kennedy School senior fellow Andrew Weiss, argue that mutual funds should have voting policies “tailored to the objectives of long-term investors,” and should include “environmental, social, and most important of all, employee factors” in their investment & voting decisions. They’d also like to see a reduction in the number of shareholder votes, noting that each year, mutual funds are required to cast over 30,000 votes at shareholder meetings.
The failure of financial intermediaries to serve the broader interests of the working investors they represent has been a recurring theme for Chief Justice Strine. In one recent article, the Chief Justice called out them out for allowing companies to spend “worker-investors” money on political activities promoting policies that negatively impact those investors. In another article, he criticized the current corporate governance system for giving the most power over corporate decisions to investors like hedge funds – whose interests are least aligned with those of average shareholders.
Financial Intermediaries: 3 Cheers for the Big 3?
Liz recently blogged about research suggesting that the major index funds were “patsies” for management. Between that research, Chief Justice Strine’s critique of their failure to serve the interests of their investors, & concerns expressed over the implications of their ever-growing ownership positions in U.S. companies, BlackRock, State Street & Vanguard could sure use a friend.
It looks like they may have just found one in a new study that says the Big 3 have both the ability & the incentive to police misconduct by their portfolio companies – and that there’s evidence that they’re doing exactly that. Here’s an excerpt from the abstract:
In this paper, I argue that the remarkable size, permanence, and cross-market scope of the Big Three’s ownership stakes gives them the capacity and, in some cases, the incentive to punish and deter fraud and misconduct by portfolio companies. Corporate governance and securities regulation scholars have argued that these institutions have generally overriding incentives to refrain from meaningful corporate stewardship, but the facts on the ground tell a somewhat different story.
Drawing on a comprehensive review of the Big Three’s enforcement activities and interviews with key decision-makers for these institutions, I show how they have been using engagement, voting, and litigation to discipline culpable companies and managers. I also identify the “pro-enforcement” incentives that explain these actions.
The study bases its conclusions on an analysis of the involvement of the Big 3 in direct securities litigation, litigation arising out of the financial crisis, “just vote no” activism against directors of companies involved in fraud or misconduct, and significant engagements. It’s an interesting perspective – and a much more effective defense of the Big 3 than the specious stuff they’re peddling.
Restatements: 2018’s Scorecard
Audit Analytics recently released its annual report on public company restatements. Here’s an excerpt from Audit Analytics’ blog with some of the highlights:
– After 12 years of decline, the number of reissuance (“Big R”) restatements increased slightly in 2018.
– Around 70% of restatements disclosed were revision (“Little R”) restatements.
– Total restatements dropped for four consecutive years to an 18-year low.
– There were 171 restatements filed by accelerated filers, and 229 restatements disclosed by non-accelerated filers.
– About 54% of the restatements disclosed by publicly traded companies had no impact on earnings.
Shortly before the BRT issued its statement redefining its position on corporate purpose, Andrew Ross Sorkin profiled Jamie Gamble in the NYT DealBook. Gamble is a former Wall Street lawyer who has had a conversion experience and now says that the corporate clients he worked for are legally compelled to act like Patrick Bateman. Here’s an excerpt from his manifesto:
The most important problem in the world is a reasonable sounding provision of the corporate law that governs most major U.S. companies. That’s a big claim. It’s also slightly misleading. A better answer is that the above complex network of horribles all connect back to a common root that is nourished and guarded by the extraordinary power of corporate “persons” who are legally obligated to act like sociopaths.
The rule: corporate management and Boards of directors are obligated by law to make decisions that maximize the economic value of the company. Colloquially: when you invest your money in a company, the people who run that company are required to do their best to bring you the highest possible financial return on your investment rather than using your money to pursue any personal or social agenda.
Sociopath? Yes. The corporate entity is obligated to care only about itself and to define what is good as what makes it more money. Pretty close to a textbook case of antisocial personality disorder. And corporate persons are the most powerful people in our world.
Gamble’s solution – or at least part of it – would be to include language in corporate bylaws requiring boards to consider the interests of a broad range of constituencies beyond shareholders whenever they make a decision. By making this mandatory & providing shareholders with the ability to sue directors for violating these provisions, he thinks the beast can be tamed.
Counterpoint: Like Heck It Does!
Sorkin’s piece initially attracted a lot of attention, but then it sort of got overwhelmed by the sound & fury surrounding the BRT’s decision to bid farewell to shareholder primacy. That’s too bad, because I think Gamble’s views about the legal obligations of corporate directors are based on a false premise, and it’s the same one that seems to have framed at least some of the reaction to the BRT’s new statement of purpose.
I doubt there’s a single corporate lawyer who would dispute the contention that true sociopaths are by no means absent from America’s boardrooms or C-suites. But does the law really require sociopathic behavior? UCLA’s Stephen Bainbridge says no way – and also says that Sorkin & Gamble’s arguments amount to “a mass dump of uninformed silliness.” (You won’t like the Prof. when he’s mad). Here’s an excerpt from his recent blog responding to the DealBook article:
This argument is patently absurd. The corporation is a legal fiction. To paraphrase the first Baron Thurlow, who observed that the corporation has neither a soul to be damned nor a body to be kicked, the corporation has neither a mind to be psychoanalyzed not a brain to be diseased. Corporations are run by people, so if “they” act like sociopaths, it must be because they are run by sociopaths. It is estimated that psychopaths make up at most 1% of the population, so are we to believe they are disproportionately located in corporate C-suites?
Second, both Gamble and Sorkin grossly misstate the law. Sorkin writes:
“It may be an oversimplification, but if they veer from seeking profits in the name of other stakeholders, shareholders may have a legal case against them.”
That is not an oversimplification; it is a gross oversimplification. Absent proof that the directors were engaged in a breach of the duty of loyalty or certain takeover situations, the business judgment rule would preclude courts from reviewing director decisions. To be sure, that is not the purpose of the business judgment rule, but that is its effect.
Prof. Bainbridge is absolutely right on the law (see also this 2015 NYT opinion piece by the late Prof. Lynn Stout). But if you asked directors & officers of public companies what they think their legal obligations are, my guess is that their responses would be pretty consistent with Gamble’s characterization of what the law requires. The “value maximization” imperative has been internalized by a whole lot of D&Os, and has been used to justify some pretty cold-blooded corporate decisions.
By the way, if this debate sounds familiar, pundit Matthew Yglesias tweeted a similar comment last year – and got clobbered by legal academics.
“Stakeholder Governance”: What Happens to the BJR?
This recent blog from Alison Frankel poses an interesting question: if corporations undertake obligations to “stakeholders” & not merely shareholders, what does that mean for the business judgment rule? Here’s an excerpt:
Law firms are beginning to contemplate whether corporate boards will continue to be entitled to the deference afforded by the business judgment rule – which broadly shields directors from liability as long as they’re deemed to have acted in the corporation’s interest – if their decisions are prompted by rationales other than maximizing profits.
That’s particularly relevant in Delaware, where, as Chief Justice Leo Strine explained in a 2015 paper, The Dangers of Denial, corporate law is resolutely focused on stockholder welfare. Strine (who is due to retire from the Delaware Supreme Court by the end of October), is of the view that Delaware precedent does not provide leeway for judges to sanction board decisions that subordinate shareholder interests.
In other words, if directors put the interests of other stakeholders first, they risk losing the protection of the business judgment rule – at least in Delaware. If that’s so, then isn’t Gamble right about the law obligating boards to act like sociopaths in the pursuit of value maximization?
Nope. Except in very limited situations, the authority provided to Delaware directors under Section 141(a) of the DGCL includes the authority to set the time frame for achieving corporate goals without – as the Delaware Supreme Court put it in Paramount Communications v. Time – a “fixed investment horizon.” Deterimining that time frame is a matter of business judgment.
So, if you’re a director who is thinking about the long-term, you’ve got plenty of discretion to conclude in good faith that considering the interests of other stakeholders may be helpful in maximizing long-term shareholder value. But that doesn’t mean that members of the only stakeholder constituency that can vote won’t still lean on you mighty hard to do otherwise.
The sound & fury surrounding the BRT’s pronouncement prompted it to issue a lengthy “clarification” of its position – and it draws heavily on the idea of promoting the interests of other constituencies as being essential in order to create long-term shareholder value.
Dorsey’s Whitney Holmes shared the following comment, which I think nicely summarizes the issue of what Delaware law requires:
I believe that much of the debate misses the point that impact investors understand and now the BRT are starting to understand: for a given corporate decision not involving a sale of corporate control (or enactment of a preemptive defense against an acquisition), if
– choice A demonstrably returns $100 to shareholders and no benefit to anyone else, and
– choice B demonstrably returns $90 to shareholders and a meaningful but unquantifiable benefit to another interest (e.g. the environment, the wellbeing of employees, the community in which a manufacturing facility sits, etc.) that cannot be supported by a vague future benefit to the corporation that might somehow, someday be worth $10 or more, do the corporation’s directors have discretion in line with their fiduciary duties to choose B over A?
He says the answer under Delaware case law is “no,” and I think that’s right. If you’re ultimately called upon to make some sort of corporate “Sophie’s Choice,” you can’t prefer other stakeholders to shareholders – but given the deference under the BJR to the board’s assessment of the future shareholder value a particular decision would create, it’s doubtful that a board would ever find itself in this position.
