On Friday, the SEC announced its long-awaited overhaul to public company executive and director compensation disclosure rules, which the Staff has been working on for over a year and – if adopted – would be the most significant update to these rules since 2006. In the time that has transpired since we first started working on comment letters for this proposal, I changed jobs and celebrated a variety of milestones – and I’m sure many of you can say the same. It really feels like this has been a long time coming!
With all the brain cells that went into it, it was not too surprising to see that the proposing release weighs in at 542 pages. Even the fact sheet is 5 pages long! The proposal contemplates a simplified disclosure framework that is more principles-based than the current approach. Here are the highlights:
The Commission’s proposed amendments to the executive and director compensation disclosure requirements in Item 402 of Regulation S-K would:
• Limit the named executive officers (NEOs) to the principal executive officer (PEO) and principal financial officer (PFO).
• Consolidate and revise the main tabular executive compensation disclosure requirements into three new tables.
• Revise the Commission’s interpretive guidance with respect to perquisites.
• Make the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) requirement more principles-based.
• Simplify disclosure and reduce compliance burdens arising from pay-versus-performance, clawbacks, and pay ratio requirements.
• Streamline the director compensation disclosure requirements and make them more principles based
Check out Meredith’s blog today on CompensationStandards.com for more of a “deep dive” (also see this Cooley blog from Broc and this Meridian memo). I’m sure we will be continuing to discuss this in the weeks and months to come. The public comment period will remain open for 60 days following the date of publication of the proposing release in the Federal Register.
To help you find key takeaways and analysis, we’re posting memos in our “SEC Rules” Practice Area for members of CompensationStandards.com. For members of this site, we have also updated our “cheat sheet” to include this proposal. This cheat sheet continues to be a helpful resource in track rulemaking activity from the SEC, NYSE and Nasdaq!
Finally! On Thursday last week, the White House announced that nominations for two open SEC Commissioner positions have been sent to the Senate for consideration, along with two CFTC nominees. This Banking Dive article adds some color:
Trump tapped Democrat Kristin Johnson to serve as an SEC commissioner, according to a statement on the White House’s website. Johnson, a professor of law at George Washington University, served as a commissioner at the CFTC from 2022 to 2025 and, at one point, was seen as a front-runner to lead the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. through a cultural overhaul after a damning 2023 scandal.
Trump tapped Republican Steven Levine to serve as an SEC commissioner. Levine became senior counsel to the secretary of labor this month, according to LinkedIn, after a stint as general counsel for the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers and the panel’s designated ethics official.
Levine has a 4½-year history with the SEC, spending much of that time as counsel to Commissioner Mark Uyeda and later as his deputy chief of staff. Uyeda served as the SEC’s acting chair in the early months of Trump’s second term.
This LinkedIn note from an academic acquaintance of Kristin Johnson’s gives even more info on her background, pointing out that she has been focused on AI and DeFi in her prior roles. As Bloomberg notes:
If confirmed by the Senate, the individuals would fill some of the vacancies at the SEC and CFTC, which are intended to be bipartisan, five-member panels. The picks would also mark the first Democratic nominees teed up for either of the Wall Street regulators since Trump returned to the White House.
It feels like a long time since the Commission has had a full slate – but at the same time, the Commissioners are customarily nominated in bipartisan pairs – and Commissioner Peirce left pretty recently. The Senate Banking Committee is scheduled to meet this Thursday to vote on whether the nominations advance to the full Senate. If confirmed by the Senate, Kristin N. Johnson would fill Caroline Crenshaw’s spot on the Commission and have a term expiring June 5, 2029 and Steven Levine would succeed Hester Peirce and have a term expiring June 5, 2030. The SEC would still have one open seat.
In this 27-minute episode of the Women Governance Trailblazers podcast, Courtney Kamlet and I spoke with Virginia Johnson, who is a partner at Outside GC and a former public company CLO. Ginny recently published a paper about the 500+ conversations she had with leaders in business in law during a one-year sabbatical, where (among other topics) she shares thoughts about the future of the legal industry, public company advisory roles, and corporate governance. We discussed:
1. Ginny’s sabbatical decision, and what she learned from 500+ conversations about the legal profession during her year-long “break.”
2. Where Ginny thinks the legal services market and CLO pipeline is heading – and steps that currently practicing lawyers can take to prepare for potential career opportunities and risks.
3. Challenges around director entrenchment, and how to reframe corporate governance conversations to focus on competence.
4. The practical role of board advisors and lawyers in defending the rule of law.
5. Ginny’s advice for the next generation of women governance trailblazers.
To listen to any of our prior episodes of Women Governance Trailblazers, visit the podcast page on TheCorporateCounsel.net or use your favorite podcast app. If there are governance trailblazers whose career paths and perspectives you’d like to hear more about, Courtney and I always appreciate recommendations! Drop me an email at liz@thecorporatecounsel.net, or message me on LinkedIn.
The recently announced joint venture between crypto exchange OKX and NYSE-parent ICE to launch 24/7 trading of tokenized stocks under the SEC’s “Innovation Exemption” appears to be going over like a lead balloon with the issuer community. According to media reports, nearly 90% of the issuers whose stocks were targeted for tokenization have objected to their inclusion. Nevertheless, it’s full speed ahead for the OKX-ICE platform, which according to this Finance Magnates article looks a lot different than what was originally envisioned:
After roughly 90% of its target companies exercised regulatory vetoes to block third-party token trading, OKXICE has overhauled its launch roster, leaning heavily on leveraged ETFs and crypto-friendly names ahead of a planned November 23 debut.
The joint venture between crypto exchange OKX and New York Stock Exchange parent Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) announced over 70 assets for round-the-clock trading, including 59 Direxion ETFs and tokenised shares of Coinbase, Robinhood, and Circle, Reuters reported.
The offering marks a departure from the 63 blue-chip names originally proposed, underscoring how a SEC veto mechanism has given corporate boards power over blockchain secondary markets.
According to an Incrypted.com report, only 6 companies targeted for inclusion on the platform haven’t objected – Robinhood, Securitize, BitGo, Circle, Coinbase, and Strategy.
Earlier this week, I blogged about the Delaware Corporation Law Council’s white paper and draft legislation addressing precatory stockholder proposals. UCLA Prof. Stephen Bainbridge has weighed in with his comments on the Council’s proposal, and he’s not a fan. In this excerpt, he argues that the Council’s draft legislation would create a right that Delaware has never recognized:
Recall the distinction the SEC drew in its proposing release between the universal proxy rule and Rule 14a-8. The former merely replicates a state-law right to vote for directors that clearly exists. The latter’s underlying state-law right to propose precatory matters is, at best, uncertain. The Council agrees. Indeed, it goes further, suggesting that CA, Inc. v. AFSCME casts doubt on whether a stockholder-adopted bylaw could require proxy placement for business proposals, “because a corporation cannot deviate from Section 141(a) except in the charter.” (5 n.6) So consider what the Discussion Draft actually does.
In CA, Delaware’s highest court told us that a bylaw forcing the board to spend corporate funds in ways against which the board’s fiduciary duties might counsel impermissibly intrudes on the board’s § 141(a) authority. The Council’s answer is to have the General Assembly impose by statute what the stockholders arguably could not impose by bylaw. Section 141(a), of course, provides that the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of the board “except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter.”
A statute is the one instrument that can override board authority without running into AFSCME. That the Council reached for it should give us pause. When the SEC withdraws, Delaware’s default under current law is that the board controls the company’s proxy statement. Draft § 214 does not codify that default. It reverses it.
Prof. Bainbridge calls out several other issues with the proposed legislation, including its departure from Delaware’s generally contractarian approach to corporate law, its abandonment of Rule 14a-8’s ordinary business exclusion, and its elevation of precatory proposals as a method for holding boards accountable.
Check out our latest “Timely Takes” podcast featuring Cleary’s J.T. Ho & his monthly update on securities & governance developments. In this installment, J.T. reviews:
– Tokenized Stock Trading: Considerations for Issuers
– KPI Binary Options: A New Tradable Market in Company Metrics
– Implications of the Climate Action 100+ Section 21(a) Report
– Retail Voting Program Developments
– New CFIs on Registration of Comp Plan Securities & Form 4 Timing
As a bonus, J.T. also discussed the SEC’s recent CFIs on Item 2.01 of Form 8-K
As always, if you have insights on a securities law, capital markets or corporate governance issue, trend or development that you’d like to share in a podcast, we’d love to hear from you. You can email me and/or Meredith at john@thecorporatecounsel.net or mervine@ccrcorp.com.
Earlier this week on The AI Counsel Blog, I wrote about the 9th Circuit’s decision to strike down part of California’s climate disclosure statutes on First Amendment grounds. At least one prominent commenter argues that, if followed to its logical conclusion, this decision could have broad implications for the federal securities laws’ disclosure regime.
The Court upheld California’s Scope 1 and 2 disclosure requirements on the grounds that they constituted commercial speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. However, it concluded that the Scope 3 disclosure requirements and those modeled on the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) framework didn’t qualify as commercial speech. Consequently, those disclosure requirements were subject to strict scrutiny, which they could not withstand.
In a recent Business Law Prof Blog post, Prof. Ann Lipton was kind of blown away by the Court’s approach to the First Amendment issues:
The Ninth Circuit determined that Scope 3 determinations “compel[] companies to collect, synthesize, and report information about the conduct of independent actors across complex commercial networks, including suppliers, customers, distributors, and other third parties throughout the value chain. Because Scope 3 disclosures concern diffuse third-party conduct in the value chain, they are insufficiently tethered to the reporting entity’s own operations and capital transactions to qualify as commercial speech.”
From there, the court determined – essentially categorically – that they are too inherently uncertain to be of much use to investors.
As for the TCFD disclosures, the court concluded they were “noncommercial speech” that include “subjective ideological assessments,” such as identifying the transitional and physical risks of climate change, and the process for identifying and managing these risks. The court explained, “SB 261 requires companies to opine on whether climate change poses financial risks to their operations and business model, thereby making predictive judgments about uncertain future conditions. Companies must also analyze and disclose whether mitigating those risks is worth the cost, requiring them to make normative assessments about competing priorities and values….SB 261 ‘would require [a covered entity] to convey the company’s policy views on intensely debated and politically fraught topics….’” Thus, they were not commercial speech.
Reader, my jaw dropped.
The securities laws today require companies to make numerous assessments about the risks and their mitigation efforts (check out disclosures required about cybersecurity). I can’t even imagine what the world would look like if regulators had to make fine-tuned judgments about whether a required disclosure concerned “diffuse third-party conduct,” let alone “subjective ideological assessments” of risk.
Ann asks if the 9th Cir. is saying that all risk-related securities disclosures are unconstitutional, or that it’s merely the politicized nature of climate change that makes this disclosure requirement cross the line? She points out that the Court accepts the fact that climate change is real and that it has real economic effects on business, and says that if this is the baseline, “does the mere fact that some people continue to dispute the reality of climate change turn it into a politicized topic on which the government cannot compel speech to investors?”
Last week, Meredith blogged about reports indicating that AI-related disclosures are likely to remain an area of scrutiny for the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. This Debevoise memo offers guidance for public companies on some disclosure best practices in the current environment:
– Review Public and Investor-Facing Statements. Involve legal, compliance, and technical personnel in the review of SEC filings, earnings-call scripts, investor presentations, websites, and marketing materials. Private companies should apply similar scrutiny to fundraising communications. Reviews should test for inaccurate claims and material omissions, including statements that conceal or downplay a company’s use of AI or the associated financial and strategic resources, a practice sometimes called “AI hushing.”
– Define AI and Agentic Capabilities Precisely. Use consistent AI terminology internally and externally, reflecting what AI systems actually do. Distinguish conventional automation from agentic functionality, and avoid portraying pilots as scaled deployments or human-supervised workflows as fully autonomous. Descriptions of safeguards should match the controls actually in place.
– Substantiate—and Revisit—Claims About Results. Document the basis for claims about AI functionality, reliability, revenue, productivity, or staffing impacts through testing, deployment records, and other reasonable evidence. Distinguish existing capabilities and demonstrated benefits from future plans, and reassess claims as systems, adoption, and performance change.
– Use Risk Assessments to Inform Disclosures. For higher-risk AI uses, consider conducting impact assessments to identify foreseeable risks and mitigation measures. Use those findings to evaluate whether disclosures adequately address material AI uses and risks, including hallucinations, confidentiality, cybersecurity, and reliance on human review. These practices can also help mitigate securities class action risk.
The latest issue of The Corporate Executive newsletter has been sent to the printer. It is also available online to members of TheCorporateCounsel.net who subscribe to the electronic format. The issue includes the article “Legal Review of Earnings & Other Press Releases,” in which we take a deep dive into the complex world of reviewing earnings and other press releases.
If you are not already receiving the important updates we provide in The Corporate Executive newsletter, please email info@ccrcorp.com or call 1.800.737.1271 to subscribe to this essential resource.
If the SEC repeals Rule 14a-8, the states are going to have some big shoes to fill when it comes to establishing rules governing stockholder proposals. Yesterday, the Delaware Corporation Law Council took the first step in that direction when it issued a White Paper on the controversial topic of precatory stockholder proposals along with draft legislation setting forth the limited circumstances under which those proposals would be permitted.
This Gibson Dunn blog summarizes the key provisions of the draft legislation, which would add a new Section 214 to the DGCL:
– Covered companies. Section 214 would apply only to listed companies with a market capitalization of at least $30 billion, measured as of the tenth day before the notice record date for the prior year’s annual meeting. Stockholders of smaller listed companies and of private companies would not be able to submit precatory proposals, and newly public companies would have a five-year grace period before precatory proposals would be permitted.
– Number of precatory proposals. Companies would be required to allow stockholders to submit and include in the company’s proxy materials (i) up to three precatory proposals in the aggregate at companies with a market capitalization of $100 billion or more, (ii) up to two precatory proposals at companies between $50 billion and $100 billion, and (iii) one precatory proposal at companies between $30 billion and $50 billion.
– Eligible proponents. A proponent would need to beneficially own (i) at least $250,000 in market value of voting stock individually, or (ii) together with up to nine co-filers, at least $1 million in market value of company stock, in each case held continuously for 365 days as of a date 30 days before the submission deadline. A stockholder could be the proponent or co-filer of only one proposal per meeting.
Directors, officers and persons acting for them would not be eligible for proponent or co-filer roles for these purposes (meaning their ownership would not count toward the caps). If more than the permissible number of precatory proposals are submitted and not otherwise excluded, the eligible proponents (together with their respective co-filers) owning the greatest number of shares would be allowed, with ties broken by random selection.
– Timing and content. Proposals would need to be received at least 180 days before the anniversary of the prior year’s annual meeting (subject to adjustment if the meeting date is advanced by more than 30 days), and, consistent with current Rule 14a-8, the proposal and any supporting statement together could not exceed 500 words. Again, similar to the current Rule 14a-8 process, a proponent would receive a single 14-day opportunity to cure deficiencies in its submission materials or word count.
– Bases for exclusion. The Discussion Draft lists 12 bases for exclusion, most of which are borrowed from Rule 14a-8’s procedural or substantive requirements, including (i) late or incomplete submissions, (ii) excess length, (iii) failure to meet the ownership requirements, (iv) a proposal that expressly questions the character of a director nominee, (v) a proposal that primarily seeks to redress a personal grievance, and (vi) a proposal that “no rational person would determine” is relevant to the company.
A resubmission bar would apply to a proponent where the same proponent submitted a proposal at either of the two preceding annual meetings at which precatory proposals could be presented and that proposal received less than 15% of the votes cast. The Discussion Draft does not authorize exclusion based on ordinary business, substantial implementation, violation of law or the lack of power to implement, or false and misleading statements.
– Proxy placement and presentation. If the company solicits proxies, up to the number of permissible proposals would be required to be included in the company’s proxy materials and on the company’s form of proxy. The company could include a statement in response or opposition and would be required to state that the proposal and supporting statement are solely the responsibility of the proponent.
The White Paper also provides that the company and its directors and officers would not be responsible under Delaware law for the proponent’s statements. As under Rule 14a-8, no vote would be taken on a precatory proposal unless the proponent or its proxy holder attends the meeting and requests a vote or the person presiding over the meeting submits the precatory proposal for a vote.
– Disputes. Only the proponent, and not a co-filer, could challenge the company’s determination that a proponent or proposal fails to satisfy Section 214’s requirements.
– Private ordering. Charters and bylaws could neither add to nor reduce the statutory requirements. In addition, a stockholder proposal could not request that the company adopt a charter or bylaw provision or policy that would provide for the inclusion of precatory proposals in company proxy materials outside Section 214.
Binding proposals would not be subject to the limits set forth in Section 214. Stockholders could continue to present and solicit proxies in support of any binding proposal addressing proper subject matter under Delaware law. Binding proposals could be subject to reasonable advance notice bylaws, and the company would not be required to include them in its proxy materials unless required by federal law. The draft legislation provides that it would become effective upon repeal of Rule 14a-8.