February 12, 2025
New CDI Jeopardizes 13G Eligibility for Investors “Influencing” Through Director Votes
Yesterday, the Corp Fin Staff released updated CDIs on the filing of Schedules 13D and 13G. First, Question 103.11 was revised to state that a shareholder’s ability to file on Schedule 13G in lieu of the Schedule 13D otherwise required will be informed by the meaning of “control” as defined in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2. As you can see from the redline (thanks again, Corp Fin!), language about the shareholder’s discussions with management has been deleted.
New CDI 103.12 now separately describes that “discussion” factor – with significant changes from the previous language. Here it is in full:
Question: Shareholders filing a Schedule 13G in reliance on Rule 13d-1(b) or Rule 13d-1(c) must certify that the subject securities were not acquired and are not held “for the purpose of or with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.” Under what circumstances would a shareholder’s engagement with an issuer’s management on a particular topic cause the shareholder to hold the subject securities with a disqualifying “purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer” and, pursuant to Rule 13d-1(e), lose its eligibility to report on Schedule 13G?
Answer: The determination of whether a shareholder acquired or is holding the subject securities with a purpose or effect of “changing or influencing” control of the issuer is based on all the relevant facts and circumstances and will be informed by the meaning of “control” as defined in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2.
The subject matter of the shareholder’s engagement with the issuer’s management may be dispositive in making this determination. For example, Schedule 13G would be unavailable if a shareholder engages with the issuer’s management to specifically call for the sale of the issuer or a significant amount of the issuer’s assets, the restructuring of the issuer, or the election of director nominees other than the issuer’s nominees.
In addition to the subject matter of the engagement, the context in which the engagement occurs is also highly relevant in determining whether the shareholder is holding the subject securities with a disqualifying purpose or effect of “influencing” control of the issuer. Generally, a shareholder who discusses with management its views on a particular topic and how its views may inform its voting decisions, without more, would not be disqualified from reporting on a Schedule 13G. A shareholder who goes beyond such a discussion, however, and exerts pressure on management to implement specific measures or changes to a policy may be “influencing” control over the issuer. For example, Schedule 13G may be unavailable to a shareholder who:
– recommends that the issuer remove its staggered board, switch to a majority voting standard in uncontested director elections, eliminate its poison pill plan, change its executive compensation practices, or undertake specific actions on a social, environmental, or political policy and, as a means of pressuring the issuer to adopt the recommendation, explicitly or implicitly conditions its support of one or more of the issuer’s director nominees at the next director election on the issuer’s adoption of its recommendation; or
– discusses with management its voting policy on a particular topic and how the issuer fails to meet the shareholder’s expectations on such topic, and, to apply pressure on management, states or implies during any such discussions that it will not support one or more of the issuer’s director nominees at the next director election unless management makes changes to align with the shareholder’s expectations. [Feb. 11, 2025]
Pay attention to those bullet points. They may force institutional investors and asset managers to choose between engaging on voting policy topics & consequences vs. maintaining Schedule 13G eligibility. Acting SEC Chair Mark Uyeda has remarked in the past that asset managers’ engagement endeavors – when they include the implicit threat of voting against a director standing for re-election – may have the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control.
– Liz Dunshee
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