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Here’s a topic of interest that John blogged about last week on DealLawyers.com (visit that site for seasoned perspectives and practical guidance on all things deal-related):

One of the issues under Delaware law that has generated some uncertainty over the years is the extent to which the DGCL permits a corporation to create a mechanism in which shares of the same class differ in their share-based voting power depending on who holds them.  Vice Chancellor Laster’s recent decision in Colon v. Bumble, (Del. Ch.; 9/23), may go a long way toward resolving that uncertainty.

Delaware courts have permitted tenure voting arrangements, in which the voting rights of holders of the same class vary depending on how long they’ve held the shares, and other limitations, such as per capita regimes, that limit a stockholder’s voting rights based on the number of shares owned, but in Colon v. Bumble, Vice Chancellor Laster addressed a situation in which the voting rights of particular shares expressly depended on the identity of their owner.

In order to facilitate its IPO, Bumble installed an  “Up-C” structure, which resulted in a hybrid entity in which public stockholders’ enjoyed voting & economic rights through ownership of Class A shares, while pre-IPO insiders enjoyed voting rights through  ownership of Class B shares and economic rights through the ownership of their pre-IPO LLC units, each of which were convertible, when accompanied by a Class B share, into shares of Class A Common Stock.

Bumble’s charter provides that each share of Class A Common Stock is entitled to one vote, unless that share is held by one of the company’s “Principal Stockholders,” in which case it is entitled to ten votes. The charter defines the term Principal Stockholders to include the two insiders who were party to a pre-existing stockholders’ agreement with the company. It also authorized a class of Class B Common Stock, which was issued exclusively to the company’s Principal Stockholders.  Each share of Class B stock is entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of Class A shares that the holder would receive if all of its units in were converted into Class B shares at the Exchange Rate and with a Principal Stockholder receiving ten votes per Class A share.

The plaintiffs contended that the disparate voting rights enjoyed by the Principal Stockholders under this structure were invalid under Delaware law because those rights depended on the identity of the stockholder.  In response, Vice Chancellor Laster conducted a detailed and thoughtful analysis of both the relevant statutory provisions and case law, and concluded that the disparate voting rights were valid:

As required by Sections 102(a)(4) and 151(a), the charter sets out a formula that applies to all the shares in the class and that specifies how voting power is calculated. As authorized by Section 151(a), the formula makes the quantum of voting power that a share carries dependent on a fact ascertainable outside of the certificate of incorporation, namely the identity of the owner. The Class A formula is a simple one. If a Class A share is held by a Principal Stockholder, then it carries ten votes per share. If not, then a Class A share carries one vote per share.

The Class B formula is complex but reaches the same result. As long as a Class B share is held by a Principal Stockholder, then it carries ten votes per share for each Class A share that it could convert into. If the Class B share is not held by a Principal Stockholder, then then it carries one vote per share for each Class A share that it could convert into.

Under Providence, Williams, and Sagusa, having the level of voting power turn on the identity of the owner is permissible. To apply the formulas in Providence, Williams, and Sagusa, the corporation had to determine which stockholder owned the share. True, the processes also had to take into account another attribute. In Providence and Sagusa, it was how many other shares the owner held. In Williams, it was when the owner acquired the share. But the starting point in each mechanism was the identity of the owner. That is the same mechanism that the Challenged Provisions use.

From my perspective, this is a very impressive opinion, and one that any lawyer called upon to draft charter documents will want to keep in mind.  Vice Chancellor Laster provides a comprehensive seminar on Delaware statutory law and judicial opinions addressing the special attributes and limitations with respect to shares that Delaware corporations may establish in their charter documents.  Most impressively, he accomplishes this in an opinion that’s less than 35 pages long. That’s practically a text message by the Vice Chancellor’s standards.

Check out this blog from Keith Bishop for a discussion of how California law addresses the issue of disparate voting rights based on the identity of the stockholder.

– Liz Dunshee