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Here’s something John blogged on CompensationStandards.com last week:

The messy story of McDonald’s Corporation’s decision to terminate its former CEO Stephen Easterbrook added another chapter yesterday, when the SEC announced that it had initiated settled enforcement proceedings against the former CEO and the company arising out of his departure.  This excerpt from the SEC’s press release explains its allegations:

According to the SEC’s order, McDonald’s terminated Easterbrook for exercising poor judgment and engaging in an inappropriate personal relationship with a McDonald’s employee in violation of company policy. However, McDonald’s and Easterbrook entered into a separation agreement that concluded his termination was without cause, which allowed him to retain substantial equity compensation that otherwise would have been forfeited. In making this conclusion, McDonald’s exercised discretion that was not disclosed to investors.

Subsequently, in July 2020, McDonald’s discovered through an internal investigation that Easterbrook had engaged in other undisclosed, improper relationships with additional McDonald’s employees. According to the SEC’s order, Easterbrook knew or was reckless in not knowing that his failure to disclose these additional violations of company policy prior to his termination would influence McDonald’s disclosures to investors related to his departure and compensation.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Easterbrook consented to a cease & desist order prohibiting future violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and imposing a $400,000 fine and a five-year officer and director bar.  The company consented to a cease & desist order prohibiting future violations of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-3 thereunder.

As Liz blogged last year, the company sued the former CEO and reached a settlement under which it “clawed back” over $100 million in equity awards and cash based on the company’s claims that the board wouldn’t have approved a separation agreement characterizing his termination as “without cause” if it had been aware of his dishonesty and additional misconduct.  The company’s efforts to claw back that compensation, together with its other efforts to cooperate with the SEC’s investigation, resulted in the agency’s decision not to impose a financial penalty on the company.

Commissioners Peirce and Uyeda dissented from the SEC’s decision with respect to the company. In their dissenting statement, they expressed their view that the SEC was rewriting the disclosure requirements of Item 402 of Reg S-K through an enforcement proceeding. Here’s an excerpt:

We are unaware of prior Commission or staff actions or positions applying Item 402 in the way that the Order does.  Additionally, the Order can be read to suggest that the underlying reasons for why the company decided to terminate a named executive officer “without cause” instead of “with cause,” and vice versa, need to be disclosed under Item 402.  Such “hiring and firing discussion and analysis,” however, is beyond the rule’s scope.

The statement went on to note that industry practice for complying with Item 402 has developed over many years, and that an enforcement action is not “a reasonable regulatory approach” for announcing a novel interpretation.

It seems to me that the dissenters make a good point – executive termination disclosures tend to be terse, often for sound business and legal reasons. Imposing a requirement that companies must disclose the reasons why they opted to treat a particular termination as being “without cause” adds another layer of complexity to an already challenging process, without in most cases providing a significant benefit to investors.

– Liz Dunshee