Yesterday, ISS announced the launch of its Annual Global Benchmark Policy Survey, which ISS notes is “a key component of its annual policy development process exploring potential voting policy changes for 2027 and beyond” and will gather views on “governance and other topics relevant to shareholder voting decisions” from institutional investors, public companies, corporate directors and other interested market constituents.

The survey (links to a full PDF version) includes questions related to the following topics for U.S. markets:

– When board slate elections (where multiple directors are presented as a single voting item) should be considered a governance concern warranting opposition

– The impact of director tenure on independence and how many years is problematic (10+, 12+, 15+, 20+ or something else)

– Changes to a company’s incorporation jurisdiction or governing documents (how to balance benefits the company identifies with changes to shareholder rights)

– Whether to change ISS’s “perpetual withhold” policy when companies maintain certain problematic governance practices after IPO (e.g., multi-class share structures) and which board members an adverse vote recommendation should apply to

– The potential introduction of semi-annual reporting and the possible implications (whether semiannual reporting is not a concern, a positive change, a negative change or something that makes sense for smaller or pre-revenue revenue companies only)

– Whether discretionary bonus programs warrant different sector-specific treatment for financial services companies rather than generally being treated as a concern in the qualitative pay-for-performance evaluation since financial services companies indicate that formulaic bonus structures are incompatible with applicable regulatory and risk management requirements

– How to signal significant concerns regarding executive pay when no say-on-pay vote is on the ballot given that more companies may be exempt if the SEC’s “Filer Status” proposal is adopted (e.g., whether to vote against compensation committee members and which members) and what support level for compensation committee members should be considered a low vote that triggers ISS’s responsiveness policy (the 50% director election threshold or the 70% say-on-pay threshold)

– Whether and when the risk of competitive harm constitutes a compelling rationale for not disclosing forward-looking LTI performance targets

– The appropriate shareholder response when companies reduce their climate-related disclosures due to changes in regulatory reporting requirements or risks

– Whether it is appropriate to expect companies with significant exposure to nature-related risks to disclose information according to a recognized framework like TNFD

The survey is scheduled to close on August 14, 2026, at 5 p.m. ET. In addition to the survey, ISS will conduct a series of regional, topic-specific roundtable discussions.

– Meredith Ervine